





Winter, J. S., & Davidson, E. (2019). “Big data governance of personal health information and challenges to 
contextual integrity.” The Information Society, 35 (1),  36-51. doi:10.1080/01972243.2018.1542648 
 
 
Big data governance of personal health information and 
challenges to contextual integrity 
 
Jenifer Sunrise Winter, School of Communications, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, 
USA 
 




Jenifer Sunrise Winter, School of Communications, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 2550 
Campus Road, Crawford Hall 325, Hawaii 96822, USA; EMAIL:  jwinter@hawaii.edu 
 
Citation 
Winter, J. S., & Davidson, E. (2019). “Big data governance of personal health information and 





Pervasive digitization and aggregation of personal health information (PHI), along with artificial 
intelligence (AI) and other advanced analytical techniques, hold promise of improved health and 
healthcare services. These advances also pose significant data governance challenges for 
ensuring value for individual, organizational, and societal stakeholders as well as individual 
privacy and autonomy. Through a case study of a controversial public-private partnership 
between Royal Free Trust, a National Health Service hospital system in the United Kingdom, 
and Alphabet’s AI venture DeepMind Health, we investigate how forms of data governance were 
adapted, as PHI data flowed into new use contexts, to address concerns of contextual integrity, 
which is violated when personal information collected in one use context moves to another use 




Ever-increasing digital stores of personal health information (PHI) hold the promise of 
improving efficiencies, efficacy, and precision of clinical medicine (Murdoch and Detsky 
2013) via big data analytics and artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning. On the other 
hand, there are growing concerns about protection of individual privacy and the security of 
the data, while also facilitating their use to enhance clinical research and societal welfare 
(e.g., Anderson and Agarwal 2011; Belanger and Xu 2015; Diamond, Mostashari, and 
Shirky 2009; Hripcsak et al. 2014; Rosenbaum 2010; Ross et al. 2014). Such complexities 
are compounded by differing positions of stakeholders (patients, healthcare providers, third-
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In this article, we examine PHI data governance challenges that arise when the data 
are moved across different use contexts. Here data governance entails not only the 
institutional structures and processes for managing a data store or data domain, but also data 
stewardship – a fiduciary (trust) relationship between the steward and the individuals or 
entities whose data are involved (Rosenbaum 2010). Following Nissenbaum (2010), we 
consider forms of data governance with regard to their potential for ensuring contextual 
integrity. Through a case study of a controversial public-private partnership between Royal Free 
Trust, a National Health Service (NHS) hospital system in the United Kingdom, and Alphabet’s 
AI venture DeepMind Health (DMH), we investigate how forms of data governance were 
adapted, as PHI data flowed into new use contexts, to address concerns of contextual integrity, 
which is violated when personal information collected in one use context moves to another use 
context with different norms of appropriateness. This case highlights the complexities in how 
PHI data might be governed to promote healthcare innovation while also protecting privacy 
and serving the public good.  
 
 The rest of the article proceeds as follows.  The next section discusses the theoretical 
foundations of our analysis, focusing on Nissenbaum’s (2010) notion of contextual integrity 
and our earlier study where we identified five analytic dimensions for understanding forms of 
PHI data governance (Winter and Davidson 2017).  The subsequent sections discuss our research 





We first consider how shifting use contexts of PHI may challenge their contextual integrity 
(Nissenbaum 2010).  We then consider how forms for PHI data governance (Winter and 
Davidson 2017) change, as PHI data flow into new use contexts. 
 
“Big data” and PHI privacy 
 
As more transactional processes are digitized, and as everyday objects are redesigned to include 
digital sensors, computing power, and communication capabilities, the scope and volume of data 
generated offer opportunities to “mine” value from them to improve organizational performance 
(Davenport, Barth, and Bean 2012) and for entrepreneurial ventures (Lycett 2013). These trends 
are evident in the healthcare sector, which faces increasing costs and rising societal expectations 
for health services along with limited public and private funding to meet the demand (Deloitte 
2016). Application of big data analytics tools and techniques to digitized health data holds the 
promise of improving efficiencies (Blumenthal 2010) and to “greatly expand the capacity to 
generate new knowledge” (Murdoch and Detsky 2013, 1351). 
 
Security of some PHI1 are subject to government regulation because of potential harms to 
individuals or groups, depending on how these data are (or could be) used, e.g. discriminate 
against individuals based on their health status. The growing concerns about the security of 
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stores are accurate and complete) has fueled interest in data governance (Belanger and Xu 2015; 
Data Governance Institute n.d.; Elliott et al. 2013; Holmes et al. 2014; Hripcsak et al. 2014; 
Khatri and Brown 2010; Ladley 2012; Rosenbaum 2010; Zuboff 2015). These discourses range 
from a plethora of practical advice, such as how to make data governance work, to less frequent 
discussions of philosophical and societal implications of data stewardship.  
 
Data aggregation and analysis create conflict between social values related to 
privacy, personal autonomy, and liberty, attributable in part to conflicts in various 
stakeholders’ values and interests in how such data are used in socioeconomic activities 
(Nissenbaum 2010; Winter 2014). Beyond PHI data aggregation, algorithms are also used to 
predict future behavior and make judgments about individuals or groups, raising new concerns 
about privacy. As Mai (2016) has observed, with the widespread diffusion of big data analytics 
and machine learning techniques, our views of privacy must expand to consider the use of 
predictive analytics on existing data and the socioeconomic context in which they are used.  For 
instance, in healthcare organizations, predictive analytics are being used to forecast individuals’ 
health status changes for the purposes of delivering healthcare services, as well as to assess their 
likely consumption of healthcare resources (Bates et al. 2014; Wagner 2016). While these dual 
uses might be reconciled for societal and individual benefit, individual-level predictions could 
also be used to exclude high-cost individuals or populations from access to health services (Eyal 
2013). 
 
Contextual integrity and PHI data use and reuse 
 
Privacy is often cited as a human right, but there are many conflicting views on what it 
entails (Acquisti, Brandimarte, and Loewenstein 2015; Solove 2010). Moreover, such 
conceptions of privacy are not able to address the radical changes and opportunities brought 
about by new technologies. Nissenbaum (2010) argues that privacy should not be conceived 
of as a right to secrecy or control, but as “appropriate flow of personal information” within 
particular social contexts (127). Each context of information generation, storage, and use is 
characterized by an array of actor roles, activities, values, and norms about the 
appropriateness of information sharing or use in that particular context.  Contextual integrity is 
violated when personal information collected in one context moves to another use context with 
different norms of appropriateness.  
 
Acknowledging that norms may be incomplete and complex, Nissenbaum focuses on 
“countervailing values” to highlight potential conflicts and tradeoffs when personal information 
is moved to a different use context. She acknowledges that the notion of contextual integrity is 
largely conservative of the status quo, that is, preserving the existing and entrenched norms in a 
context, but she allows for the reconsideration of norms based on higher social values, goals, and 
norms. Higher values include prevention of informational harms or informational inequality, and 
preservation of autonomy and freedom, human relationships, and democracy.  Thus, the notion 
of contextual integrity addresses privacy via “appropriate information flows” and by comparing 
“entrenched normative practices against novel alternatives or competing practices on the basis of 
how effective each is in supporting, achieving, or promoting relevant contextual values” 
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The notion of contextual integrity is valuable for examining the implications of large- 
scale personal health data collection, aggregation, use and reuse enabled by ICT (information 
and communications technologies), which facilitate the flow of personal information from one 
use context to another with different norms, often embedded in ICT systems and 
information practices. As data digitization, aggregation, and AI applications expand rapidly 
in healthcare, the potential for contextual integrity violations is substantial. For instance, norms 
for PHI flows in the patient-health care provider relationship clash with the norms for use of 
personal data in advertising. At the same time, PHI data flows such as transfer of individuals’ 
clinical data into public health, medical research or health system policy contexts might be 
justified on the grounds of supporting higher social value.  Nonetheless, any change in use 
context of PHI data is a potential violation of contextual integrity, and thus merit consideration 
by policy makers and health system stakeholders. 
 
Forms of PHI data governance   
 
Despite many calls for governance of PHI so as to protect individual privacy while also making 
it available for health system research and innovation, effective governance remains an elusive 
goal (British Academy and the Royal Society 2017; Elliott et al. 2013; Hripcsak et al. 2014; 
OECD, 2017; Rosenbaum 2010; Ross et al. 2014). Laws and regulations for patients’ privacy 
limit the degree to which some forms of PHI can be shared or sold. Other PHI, such as data 
generated by individuals using consumer electronics, is largely unregulated (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services 2018). Beyond protecting individual privacy, the proprietary claims 
that organizations stake on health data generated or maintained by their own ICT can limit data 
sharing for societal purposes such as research or system improvements at inter-organizational 
level (Rosenbaum 2010). The complexity and limited standardization of health data, along with a 
plethora of health ICT systems lacking interoperability, also contribute to technical hurdles 
(Eden et al. 2016). 
 
 A variety of governance forms are emerging to address the challenges and opportunities 
of health data governance. They are identifiable by prototypical arrangements of core properties 
including goals, authority relations, technologies, and markets served (Scott 2001). In a study of 
PHI data governance (Winter and Davidson 2017), we identified five analytic dimensions that 
characterize various PHI governance forms and developed a preliminary taxonomy of forms 
arising from different arrangements of these dimensions. Table 1 summarizes the analytical 
dimensions. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Data domains (dimension 1) are areas and purposes for which data are collected.  PHI 
data domains may include individuals’ medical histories, clinical data stored in electronic health 
record systems (EHRs) at hospitals, laboratories, and private medical practices; data related to 
prescriptions; data from medical devices (e.g. glucose monitors, personal health trackers like 
Fitbit); medical claims data; and genomic data in medical or commercial databanks. Additional 






Winter, J. S., & Davidson, E. (2019). “Big data governance of personal health information and challenges to 
contextual integrity.” The Information Society, 35 (1),  36-51. doi:10.1080/01972243.2018.1542648 
 
 
behaviors, even if those data are not classified as medical (e.g. retail purchases, Internet searches 
for information on health conditions) (Bates et al. 2014; Libert 2015; Wagner 2016). 
 
Stakeholders (dimension 2) are individuals, organizations, and groups with an interest in 
the (potential) value of PHI data. They include patients, doctors, hospitals, pharmacies, third-
party insurers, government agencies, data aggregators, and technology firms (Arndt 2018; 
Davidson, Østerlund, and Flaherty  2015). Stakeholders hold different values and interests with 
regard to PHI data and have different norms and practices for their use. Some values are widely 
shared, such as ensuring safety and quality in health services delivery, but there are also 
conflicting interests (Rosenbaum 2010). 
 
The value afforded by PHI data (dimension 3) refers to how PHI data can create 
stakeholder value. PHI data can be applied to more precisely deliver healthcare services to 
individuals, to improve overall health system efficiency, to support an organization’s competitive 
strategies, or to generate revenue through resale, to name just a few. Barrett, Oborn, and 
Orlikowski (2016) identified six different types of value that different stakeholders gained from 
interacting on an online health community platform – financial, epistemic, ethical, service, 
reputational, and platform. However, Tempini (2017) notes data reuse to enhance one 
stakeholder group’s value may make data less valuable to others, because the processes of 
data generation, use, and reuse, and infrastructure development activities are not easily 
separated. Moreover, shifting data from one context to another may lessen value for some 
stakeholders.  For instance, removing personally identifiable elements from a PHI data flow, 
before transferring data for secondary uses, may preserve individual privacy, but loss of 
individual-level information make PHI data less valuable for researchers looking for disease 
patterns, policy makers looking for health system inefficiencies, or marketers seeking to 
promote a product or service. 
 
Governance goals (dimension 4) are values-based objectives for governing a data 
domain. Commonly cited governance goals are protecting privacy, ensuring data security from 
unauthorized access, facilitating ease of data access to legitimate users, and ensuring public trust 
in governance (British Academy and the Royal Society 2017). Other possible goals include 
giving individuals and groups voice (e.g. through personal health record systems), supporting 
innovation, and protecting intellectual property.  Some governance goals may be broadly 
acknowledged or even shared within and across use contexts, but there could be conflict over 
others. 
 
Finally, governance forms (dimension 5) refer to organizational units, practices, policies 
and regulations, and technologies that carry out governance goals (Rosenbaum 2010). For 
instance, privacy laws and regulations are governance forms that specify how identifiable PHI 
must be managed and the entities that are responsible for doing so (e.g. health service providers, 
pharmacies, insurance companies) in order to attain privacy goals. Algorithms for de-
identification of PHI data are governance forms intended to address privacy goals and also to 
also make PHI more accessible for exchange or sale by reducing regulatory oversight (Hripcsak 
et al. 2014). A data access committee is a governance form that may set policies and evaluate 






Winter, J. S., & Davidson, E. (2019). “Big data governance of personal health information and challenges to 
contextual integrity.” The Information Society, 35 (1),  36-51. doi:10.1080/01972243.2018.1542648 
 
 
among stakeholders, PHI data value, and governance goals is important to evaluate the 
effectiveness of data governance forms overall and their efficacy in managing data flows across 
contexts so as to maintain contextual integrity. 
 
 Two examples illustrate how these dimensions characterize various forms of PHI data 
governance2. The most common form is organizational-level governance, in which a hospital or 
other clinical entity serves as the steward for and primary user of PHI data generated on its own 
ICT. The hospital maintains individual-level clinical data along with operational data such as 
records of clinician-provided services and financial reimbursements (data domains). These PHI 
data are “owned” by the organization, though government regulations may require data to be 
shared with accreditation agencies, researchers or patients (governance goals and forms). The 
organization is responsible for protecting patient privacy (as regulated) and data security, while 
also making data easily accessible to clinicians as they carry out their duties and analysts to 
assess the efficiency and quality of service delivery (governance goals, data value), generally 
through ICT such as electronic health record systems or data repositories (governance forms). 
Data may also be used to stratify patients according to disease states or hospital resource 
consumption in order to design intervention strategies (data value). Thus, individual patients and 
their care providers as well as the hospital, its funders, and the public served by the hospital are 
all stakeholders within the domain of this governance form. 
 
A much different governance form is individual-level PHI data governance.  Here, 
individuals generate data by using consumer electronics such as wearable activity trackers and 
glucose monitors (Cortez et al. 2018; Montgomery, Chester, and Kopp 2018) or by entering 
information about their health-related activities into mobile apps (data domains).  Individuals 
share data governance rights and responsibilities with the IT firms providing the devices or the 
data aggregation services (stakeholders), and data typically reside on the IT vendor’s cloud-
based infrastructure and in the individual’s mobile devices such as a smart phone (governance 
form). In the U.S., these data are not covered by federal PHI regulations but instead are governed 
by the privacy policies of the IT firm (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2016) 
(governance form). For the individual, these data hold value as sources of health monitoring and 
improvement, whereas to the IT firms, these detailed personal data represent potential profit, by 
selling advertising access to consumers, selling PHI data, or using data resources to develop 
advanced data analytics capabilities (data value) (Sankin 2017).  
 
These and other governance forms develop around ICT-generated health data and are 
adjusted when data shift from one context into another, particularly where informational 
practices, norms, and stakeholder values differ from those in the original setting, e.g. firms 
seeking to merge consumer-generated health data and protected clinical health data onto their 
own technology platforms (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2017, Arndt 2018; 
Deering 2013). Governance conflicts are possible among traditional health system stakeholders 
as well, for instance, between independent policy researchers, focused on reducing health 
systems costs through big data analytics, and clinical organizations, whose economic and 
competitive interests may not be served by PHI-enhanced policy research (Eden et al. 2016; 
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With this theoretical grounding, we now return to our research questions of how data 
governance forms are adapted as PHI flows into new use contexts and the implications for 
PHI contextual integrity of these adaptations. Our five analytical dimensions provide insight 
into whether or how adaptations in governance forms occur and how violations of contextual 
integrity are addressed through new or altered forms.   
 
Research design and methods 
 
We analyze, applying our five analytic dimensions, the controversy surrounding a public-
private data sharing arrangement in the UK – the DeepMind Health (DMH)-Royal Free 
Trust agreement.  
 
DMH is a technology firm dedicated to developing AI applications for healthcare and 
is owned by Google’s parent company, Alphabet. The company states that it operates 
independently from Google and has the goal of “proving that [AI technologies] could have 
positive social impact” (DeepMind 2017a). Royal Free Trust is a hospital system operated 
by the National Health Service (NHS) of the UK government.  
 
In the first stage of data analysis, we gathered and read an array of sources related to 
the DMH-Royal Free Trust agreement, including materials produced by DMH, Royal Free 
Trust/NHS, and the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). They 
included data sharing agreements, policy reports, news stories, and public interviews with 
stakeholders. In each case, the related web domain (DMH, NHS and Royal Free Trust, ICO) 
was searched for original documents, including formal statements, blogs, contracts/service 
agreements, FAQs (frequently asked questions), and related reports. We also collected 
secondary materials, largely from news outlets covering the case, for analysis. They 
included additional comments from stakeholders weighing in on the case. From this 
analysis, we created a detailed case narrative with important dates, actions, and actors, as 
well as a timeline of key events (Table 2) to represent these activities. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 In the second phase, we applied our five analytical dimensions (Table 1) to identify 
tensions and conflicts arising from the migration of PHI data from one context (data 
governance form at Royal Free Trust) to a novel context (data governance form at DMH). 
To highlight the implications of these moves, we first outlined the existing practices at the 
Royal Free Trust (prior to DMH-Royal Free Trust agreement). We then examined new 
informational practices arising from the agreement and identified where existing 
informational norms and values conflicted with the new ones emerging from changing 
sociotechnical arrangements for data governance as a result of the agreement. We discuss 
our findings and analysis in the following section. 
 
Findings and analysis  
 






Winter, J. S., & Davidson, E. (2019). “Big data governance of personal health information and challenges to 




Prior to Royal Free Trust’s partnership with DMH, its PHI data were governed primarily 
within the context of healthcare services provided it provided to its patients — data collected 
and used in the actual delivery of services (e.g. orders for laboratory tests) and in administrative 
work (e.g. billing).  NHS data sharing policies specified how patient data might be shared with 
health researchers. 
 
The data domain (clinical health data) included personally identifiable information 
on specific individuals treated at the Royal Free Trust hospitals. It included a variety of 
information stored in electronic health records such as diagnoses, laboratory test results, and 
medical imaging. The key actors involved in handling of PHI included various employees 
directly engaged in patient care (e.g. nurses, technicians, physicians, clerical staff), clinical 
and public health researchers, and administrators. Other stakeholders included government 
policymakers (who analyzed the data in aggregate form), individual patients who sought 
health care at Royal Free Trust, and citizens of the UK, who collectively fund and seek 
services from the Royal Free Trust and also other parts of the NHS. 
 
The value of the PHI from all stakeholders’ perspectives included improving 
individual treatment and health outcomes. Additionally, Royal Free Trust, NHS, and 
government policymakers saw value in the data to improve operational efficiency, reduce 
expenditures, and to improve quality of care through data analytics. Key goals of 
governance included maintaining the privacy and security of PHI, efficient organizational 
access to PHI for delivery of care to patients, and analysis of PHI for innovation, as well as 
for evaluation of organizational operations and improvements. Data flows were governed by 
existing laws and regulations (e.g. Data Protection Act) and institutional policies (e.g. Royal 
Free Trust’s privacy statement).  
 
On September 29, 2015 Royal Free Trust signed a contract (“Information sharing 
agreement” 2015) with DMH and thereafter transferred the PHI of 1.6 million patients to it. 
This contract enabled DMH to access five years’ worth of patient data (“Information sharing 
agreement” 2015; Hawkes 2016) and “a wide range of healthcare data … This will include 
information about people who are HIV-positive, for instance, as well as details of drug 
overdoses and abortions” (Hodson 2016, 3). These data were used to test DMH’s first 
application, Streams (DeepMind 2017a). The Streams application provides intelligent alerts, 
clinical notes, and task management for patients with acute kidney injury to physicians and 
nurses via iPads and iPhones. DMH reports that data are transmitted with end-to-end 
encryption from Royal Free Trust to an NHS-approved data center in the UK. Once at the 
DMH site, patient data from a range of hospital IT systems are mined using DMH’s 
proprietary algorithms in real-time. DMH reviews the data for health issues, and if problems 
are found, DMH “sends an urgent secure smartphone alert to the right clinician to help, 
along with information about previous conditions so they can make an immediate 
diagnosis” (DeepMind 2017e). This, and similar applications developed with DMH, have 
the potential to improve healthcare delivery and services to patients while also measuring 
and monitoring organizational performance to reduce undesirable variability in health 
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Emergence of a new PHI organizational governance form 
 
In this case, PHI data were migrated from a context with a well-established and legitimated 
data governance form, in which the health services organization creates and manages its 
own PHI data (i.e., Royal Free Trust acting as data steward) to a novel form of PHI data 
governance, in which a global IT firm (Alphabet through its subsidiary DMH) assumed 
stewardship responsibilities and rights over this same data. Royal Free Trust and DMH have 
argued that DMH acted only as an agent of the former (i.e., an outsourced data analysis 
organization), working within its data governance framework. However, our analysis 
indicates that the data sharing agreement engendered a new and distinct data governance 
form and therefore PHI data migration from Royal Free Trust to DMH violated the 
contextual integrity of the data and the adjustments as yet have only partially mitigated these 
violations.  
 
Expanded data domains 
 
While data sharing arrangement with DMH provided access to five years’ worth of patient 
data (“Information sharing agreement” 2015), most of this data was not directly relevant to 
the Streams application developed by DMH (Powles and Hodson 2017), as it included records of 
many people not directly benefiting from Streams. Moreover, the data analytic techniques used 
in Streams were not clearly explained. Beyond the use of PHI for the Streams application, how it 
would be utilized by DMH in development of other applications was not specified in the 
agreement. This raised concerns from patient advocacy groups, who questioned why DMH needs 
so much data and noted that data could be used for most anything (Hawkes 2016). Moreover, 
predictive analytics applied to PHI could generate new types of data about individuals by 
categorizing them according to health conditions or behavioral risks.  
 
DMH stated that PHI would not be combined with other data sources (such as Google’s 
Internet search data or retail data), but the firm’s intention to develop AI applications leaves open 
the possibility that the PHI could help it expand to other non-health-related domains. Moreover, 
the long-term implications of sharing PHI data with a subsidiary of Alphabet remain a concern. 
An independent panel of experts set up to advise DeepMind recommended in 2018 that 
DeepMind should clarify its business model and relationship with Alphabet, as the AI subsidiary 
“would eventually have to prove its value either by sharing algorithms and data, or by making 




Although there had always been multiple stakeholders (e.g. clinicians, laboratory 
technicians, administrators, researchers) accessing the Royal Free Trust patient data, the 
DMH partnership introduced diverse actors and goals. DMH describes itself simply as a 
“data processor … a third party that must only process this data in strict accordance with the 
instructions of the data controller and the law” (DeepMind 2017c). However, stakeholders 
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employees and also Alphabet corporate management. The addition of these corporate 
stakeholders brings new values and interests to stewardship of the Royal Free Trust patients’ 
PHI, as patient data becomes subject to analytics beyond their original healthcare context and 
that too by for-profit corporations. For instance, while DMH developed an application — 
Streams — for Royal Free Trust and its constituents, DMH’s AI researchers may be primarily 
focused on improving algorithms in general, with a broader goal of exporting the DMH’s AI 
work (if not specifically the data) to other contexts. 
 
Transfer of PHI data to a subsidiary of Alphabet, which monitors Internet activity of 
billions of individuals, provoked a strong opposition from public and policy makers to the 
data sharing arrangement (Independent Review Panel 2017). Despite assurances that Royal 
Free Trusts patients’ PHI would not be combined with other data, questions about who might 
benefit from data-sharing partnerships between corporations and trusted public institutions 
contributed to a “trust gap” (Sharon 2016). 
 
 
Value in the PHI data 
 
The migration of PHI to new contexts for new value propositions creates conflicts between 
individual and corporate interests, highlighting the “unresolved tension that emerges when 
altruistic modes of behavior and financial profit-seeking overlap; and this in ways that are 
often not transparent” (Sharon 2016, 568). Originally PHI was collected to improve health 
outcomes of individuals and the effectiveness of the overall healthcare system but with the 
introduction of DMH as a stakeholder the value of PHI took on new hue: opportunities for 
development of profitable applications, services, and algorithms.  
 
These values are not necessarily contradictory, but data use and reuse is not seamless 
(Tempini 2017). Dr. Julian Huppert, head of an Independent Review Panel instituted by DMH to 
provide independent oversight and ensure public accountability for its health endeavors, noted 
that the NHS PHI data were not as optimized for reuse as DMH had expected: "DeepMind could 
use AI to help with healthcare, but I think that it found that the state of data in the NHS was not 
as good as it had hoped so it had to step back from this" (Wakefield 2017, 12). Further, he noted 
that, “a huge amount of work is needed to make the NHS more digital. We would get much more 
value from NHS data if it was in a secure, centrally managed system” rather than distributed 
across hundreds of databases that “don’t talk to each other” (Saran 2017, 7-8). While few would 
argue against increased digitization of health data through interoperable information systems, 
designing such systems to optimize their utility for research versus for use by patients or 
clinicians could reduce the value of PHI to them and also increase workload (Tempini 2017). 
 
Whether the initial machine learning projects have been successful or not, DMH clearly 
intended to deploy such analytical techniques to PHI obtained from Royal Free Trust sources. 
Although DMH claimed that AI was not used to develop the Streams application, the revised 
2016 services agreement between DMH and Royal Free Trust outlined a list of collaborative 
goals and noted that DMH is a technology company specializing in “understanding and 






Winter, J. S., & Davidson, E. (2019). “Big data governance of personal health information and challenges to 
contextual integrity.” The Information Society, 35 (1),  36-51. doi:10.1080/01972243.2018.1542648 
 
 
from machine learning and systems neuroscience – artificial intelligence (‘AI’), in order to build 
powerful general-purpose learning algorithms” (Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust 
2016, 1), and also that DMH’s goals is to gain “data for machine learning research under 
appropriate regulatory and ethical approvals” (Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust 2016, 
4; “Services agreement” 2016). Moreover, DMH would retain intellectual property rights to such 
techniques, which could be used beyond their original healthcare context. 
 
Tensions over the value in the data emerged even within the NHS itself as new 
technologies enable new possibilities to extract value from PHI. Martin Severs, medical director 
at NHS Digital, division of NHS responsible for “transforming health and care through 
technology,” thus conceptualized the value of the PHI:   
 
All the data the NHS holds is funded by the British taxpayer. Any use of that data should 
generate benefits back to the taxpayer. While we should open up enough data as possible 
for specific research and use cases, within those data-sharing agreements there should be 
a return on investment on that data. There is billions of pounds’ worth of value in this 
data. We need to encourage innovation and allow failure at low costs, but there needs to 
be a return on investment of that data back into the NHS. (quoted in Saran 2017, 14) 
 
Alternately, others in the NHS have argued that PHI should only be used for AI when medical 
innovations provide societal benefit and data are “de-identified and constrained by a legal 
contract to balance the benefits of data and the risk to privacy” (Saran 2017, 11).  
 
New data governance goals 
 
The shift from narrow use of PHI by Royal Free Trust clinicians (governed by regulations such 
as the Data Protection Act) to the broad use by DMH in search of opportunities for development 
of AI applications gave rise to conflicts in data governance goals.  
 
In fact DMH-Royal Free Trust partnership may have tried to sidestep individual patient’s 
consent for PHI use (Powles and Hodson 2017). In July 2017, ICO ruled that the DMH-Royal 
Free Trust trial had not complied with data protection laws, noting in particular that patients were 
not adequately informed that their data would be used as part of the test (Information 
Commissioner’s Office 2017): 
 
My investigation has determined that under the terms of the agreement with the Royal 
Free, DeepMind processed approximately 1.6 million partial patient records for the 
purpose of clinical safety testing without those patients being informed of this processing. 
I was not satisfied that the Royal Free had properly evidenced a condition for processing 
that would otherwise remove the need to obtain the informed consent of the patients 
involved and our concerns in this regard remain (Information Commissioner’s Office 
2017, 4). 
 
DMH emphasized its role as a “data handler” though a secure data sharing arrangement, 
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patient care (Hawkes 2016). However, this interpretation limited the patients’ voice in deciding 
how their personal health data will be used. Additionally, despite DMH’s assurance that the 
contract was "no different" from other data-sharing agreements with the NHS, “this first contract 
had differed from the standard ones the NHS signed with third-parties” (Wakefield 2017, 5)3. 
Elizabeth Dunham, the UK’s Information Commissioner, said: 
 
There’s no doubt the huge potential that creative use of data could have on patient care 
and clinical improvements, but the price of innovation does not need to be the erosion of 
fundamental privacy rights. Our investigation found a number of shortcomings in the way 
patient records were shared for this trial. Patients would not have reasonably expected 
their information to have been used in this way, and the Trust could and should have been 
far more transparent with patients as to what was happening. We’ve asked the Trust to 
commit to making changes that will address those shortcomings, and their co-operation is 
welcome. The Data Protection Act is not a barrier to innovation, but it does need to be 




New data governance forms 
 
As stakeholders’ values and interests with regards to PHI data diverged, new governance forms 
developed. Broadly, these governance structures fall into following three categories:   
 
1. Organizational governance forms.   
 
New organizational governance forms such as the governmental review boards were 
established to provide ethical oversight of PHI data and to determine what access will be granted 
and to whom. In the case of DMH-Royal Free Trust partnership, ICO appointed an oversight 
committee for all uses of the PHI. However, panel members are not civil servants and thus are 
not subject to government (or NHS) oversight and accountability.  DMH also sought to 
establish a new organizational governance form to oversee the use of the data in this public-
private partnership, possibly in response to public concerns and anticipated regulatory 
intervention. In February 2016, as described by DMH, it assembled an Independent Review 
Panel comprised of: 
  
respected public figures to act in the public interest as unpaid Independent Reviewers 
of DeepMind Health. They meet four times a year to scrutinize our work with the 
NHS, and will publicly issue an annual statement outlining their findings after 
reviewing our data sharing agreements, our privacy and security measures, and our 
product roadmaps. (DeepMind 2017d, 2-3) 
 
This panel first met on June 14, 2016 and issued its first annual report (Independent Review 
Panel 2017) on July 1, 2017.4 In October 2017, DeepMind (parent company of DMH) created a 
new ethics unit, the DeepMind Ethics & Society Fellows, to conduct research on privacy, 
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“gigantic conflict of interest” because here we have “a commercial AI giant researching the 
ethics of its own technology’s societal impacts” (Lomas 2017, 5). 
 
New organizational governance forms also included the revised data sharing agreement 
in November 2016 and DMH’s creation of a series of patient engagement workshops, intended to 
increase transparency and patient buy-in for new developments related to health data and AI 
(DeepMind Health 2017a). Further, all parties have agreed that Alphabet or other corporations 
will not have access to the PHI data.  
 
2. Regulatory governance forms. 
 
This case also highlighted the limitations of the existing NHS policies on PHI data. On 
April 29, 2016, the New Scientist published the original “Information sharing agreement” 
(2015) that its correspondent had obtained through a Freedom of Information (FOI) request 
(Hodson 2016). In May 2016, ICO opened an investigation into the data sharing 
arrangement. At that time, it noted at least one (unspecified) complaint from a member of 
the public. During this investigation, which concluded on July 3, 2017, DMH and the Royal 
Free Trust revised their data sharing agreement (“Services agreement …” 2016). However, 
the ICO ruled that DMH and the Royal Free Trust had failed to comply with the Data 
Protection Act.  
 
A specific regulatory concern was that patients were not adequately informed that their 
data would be used as part of the DMH project (Information Commissioner’s Office 2017). 
Identifiable PHI data on all patients seen at Royal Free Trust were migrated without consent of 
or notification to individual citizens (Powles and Hodson 2017). Patients were not given a 
meaningful path to opt out or to engage in critical debate about the use of their data. This 
lack of disclosure limited a key regulatory provision – the right of individuals to opt out of data 
reuse – that supports governance goals of transparency and patient voice. Policies and procedures 
adopted by Royal Free Trust and DMH did not trigger debate among stakeholders until after 
issues were raised publicly (Independent Review Panel 2017; Powles and Hodson 2017). 
Although Royal Free Trust later indicated that patients could opt out of this data sharing via the 
Trust’s website, whether this constitutes a meaningful option for consent or withdraw consent is 
questionable, as patients were not were not individually notified of this option.5  
 
Just days before ICO’s ruling (July 1, 2017), the Independent Review Panel had 
concluded its first annual report and noted concern about the regulatory compliance and 
recommended that DMH “should respond positively to any recommendations that result 
from the ICO investigation” and “set as a firm policy that all future contracts with the public 
sector should also be published openly, with minimal or no redactions” (Independent Review 
Panel 2017, 11). After the ICO decision, Royal Free Trust was directed to halt all future trials 
until an adequate legal basis under the Data Protection Act (or GDPR) was in place. Further, it 
was required to explain in advance how it will “comply with its duty of confidence to patients in 
any future trial involving personal data” (Information Commissioner’s Office 2017, 11), create a 
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The ICO and Independent Review Panel also expressed concern that data sharing 
agreements involving PHI may conflict with the GDPR (Saran 2017). The Independent Review 
Panel recommended convening a group to design a new model of regulation that addresses the 
conflicting goals of information technology companies, government medical services, regulatory 
authorities, and the public: 
 
That tech providers, the Department of Health and the Information Commissioner should 
discuss together a new system which protects patient data whilst allowing innovation and 
that collaborative discussions should take place in safe places, similar to Research 
Council “sandpits” in order to create a new model for regulation (Independent Review 
Panel 2017, 11). 
 
3. Technical/algorithmic governance forms.  
 
In response to widespread criticism, DMH announced it is developing an automated 
audit of PHI health data access using technology similar to blockchain to address concerns 
(DeepMind 2017f; Hern 2017). This “Verifiable Data Audit” is an innovative form of 
sociotechnical governance intended to provide a real-time audit and verification of data 
access and use, enabling appropriate authorization for access of PHI that is consistent with 
patient consent. DMH notes that this audit includes:  
 
giving our partner hospitals an additional real-time and fully proven mechanism to 
check how we’re processing data … For example, an organization holding health 
data can’t simply decide to start carrying out research on patient records being used 
to provide care, or repurpose a research dataset for some other unapproved use. In 
other words: it’s not just where the data is stored, it’s what’s being done with it that 
counts. We want to make that verifiable and auditable, in real-time, for the first time 
(DeepMind, 2017f, 8). 
 
That is, while this digital ledger is intended to focus largely on assuring that data is private 
and secure (i.e., who has access to the data, where it moves), DeepMind claimed that it will 
also enable transparency of data use (i.e., how it is processed). This latter function is as yet 
unsubstantiated, as the machine learning algorithms that actually make decisions about 




The DMH-Royal Free Trust case highlights how the interests of different stakeholders in PHI 
data diverge and often conflict.  On the one hand, the Streams application is reportedly 
benefiting individual patients such as those undergoing treatment for acute kidney injury at 
the Royal Free Trust (DeepMind 2017e; Lydall 2017; Royal Free Hospital 2017).  On the 
other hand, this broad PHI data-sharing arrangement has generated widespread concern and 
criticism (Hodson 2016; Independent Review Panel 2017; Powles and Hodson 2017; Ram 
and Waters 2018). Consequently, policymakers and regulators have examined the details of 
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allowable actions are for different parties (Lydall 2017; Powles and Hodson 2017). 
 
Our analysis, summarized in Table 3, highlights instances of actual or anticipated 
contextual integrity conflicts with the shift of governance of PHI data from in-house patient care 
within Royal Free Trust to a partnership with a for-profit IT entity, DMH. Existing governance 
forms, particularly regulatory governance forms, failed to anticipate the rise of PHI contextual 
integrity conflicts.  
 
[insert table 3 about here] 
 
The resulting public and regulatory scrutiny of these conflicts led to the development of 
new governance forms.  The objective here was not to prohibit the flow of PHI data, as the 
potential societal benefit of healthcare AI is substantial, but rather to reinforce the existing norms 
for privacy for a new use context. For example, the Institutional Review Board established by 
DMH is a governance form intended to build public trust in DMH’s PHI data-governance and to 
ensure regulatory compliance.  DMH’s Verifiable Data Audit is a socio-technical governance 
form intended to increase transparency in how DMH uses PHI data.  The Royal Free Trust’s 
online patient opt-out feature provides another socio-technical governance form to give patients’ 
voice in how their PHI data are used.  
 
 Despite adjustments to governance forms, some major concerns about the contextual 
integrity of PHI have yet to be fully resolved, particularly those related to the efficacy of 
informed consent practices to give patients’ voice. Expectations for the potential societal benefits 
to be realized from aggregated PHI complicate the question of how much voice citizens should 
have in these decisions. Here prioritizing large scale, open-ended data sharing for the purpose 
of health system improvement and innovation, while desirable values per se conflict with 
respect for patients’ voice. This was evident in the initial failures of system features for 
patients to either opt-in or opt-out of the data sharing arrangement. Sharon (2016) notes that 
many emerging forms of big data research pose challenges to our existing understanding of 
informed consent, where all possibilities of data use, and the risks it poses, are not known at the 
time of data collection. The lack of transparency in the corporate data-sharing arrangements and 
the opacity of AI/machine learning systems will necessarily challenge governance and 
sociotechnical approaches to informed consent. Therefore new models of “‘open,” “broad,” and 
“portable’” consent have emerged (Sharon 2016).  
 
Our analysis of this case highlights the governance challenges of harnessing PHI big data 
resources to enhance society, organizational effectiveness, and individual lives, while also 
respecting the rights and interests of diverse stakeholders. Realizing value from PHI data is not 
a zero-sum game, as health data can be used and reused to support multiple forms of value 
creation (Barrett, Oborn, and Orlikowski 2016; Tempini 2017). Neither is it necessarily a 
win-win situation, as the value of PHI data is tied to the social and economic purposes and 
outcomes of data-inspired policies and practices, where conflicts in values, norms, and 
interests among stakeholders abound. This information is often intensely personal 
(Independent Review Panel 2017), and its (mis)use may hold unintended or unforeseen 
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In this case, the two dominant organizational actors – DMH and Royal Free Trust – 
agreed to share PHI data so as to promote health services innovation through advanced ICTs 
(including AI approaches) for the benefit of patients and the public. This is an immensely 
exciting prospect. One could argue that the provision of specific services to patients (such as 
the Streams application) warrants DMH’s reuse of the PHI data for applications in other 
domains, and ultimately monetization of these applications. In this case, unbounded 
possibilities of PHI data reuse under DMH’s governance form engendered contextual 
violations (cf. Denham 2017) requiring mitigation through new governance forms such as 
advisory committees (e.g., the Independent Review Panel) and DMH’s Verifiable Data Audit 
(DeepMind 2017f; Hern 2017) to maintain some balance.  
 
Regulations are important tools for governing organizational behavior, but they also pose 
the risk of stifling innovation. Ultimately, data governance goals and structures need to optimize 
the outcomes across the interests of a diverse array of stakeholders. The failure of existing laws 
and policies to fully protect patients’ PHI in this case led to the Independent Review Panel 
to recommend new regulatory forms amid growing concern that existing regulatory 
mechanisms may not be adequate to govern big data analytics and AI. For example, it is 
possible that an algorithm may learn to be more precise in identifying health concerns for 
particular populations while being less precise for others, thereby reinforcing or 
exacerbating existing health disparities. This algorithmic discrimination may be deliberate 
or an unexpected outcome. In other domains, scholars have begun to develop algorithmic 
audits, field experiments that detect discrimination (Sandvig, Hamilton, Karahalios, and 
Langbort 2014). But such efforts are blunted by the opacity with regard to how the algorithms 
work, given their corporate ownership and control.  However, increased public pressure may lead 
to the furtherance of such an audits, or other technical means of providing oversight. This call is 
echoed by the Royal Statistical Society (2016), which suggests an inquiry about “methods that 
the public can use to hold algorithms to account” (3) and expert public testimony (cf. House of 
Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence 2017). 
 
The tensions regarding PHI use are likely to increase in the future. The UK’s Data 
Protection Act was replaced with the European Union General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) on May 25, 2018.  Kuner et al. (2017) have observed that Article 22(1) of the 
GDPR relates to “personal data used for automated decisions” and notes that data should 
only be gathered for “specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes, and subsequent processing 
that is incompatible with those purposes is not permitted” (1). Since machine learning often 
relies on live data streams, “it may be difficult to reconcile such dynamic processes with 
purposes that are specified narrowly in advance” (1). Given such concerns in their review of 
the DMH-Royal Free Trust agreement, the Independent Review Panel concluded that a new 
model of regulation should be explored (Independent Review Panel 2017, 11).  
 
The novel use of AI raises several questions about whose values are encoded into 
algorithms and thus translated into machine judgments. As many scholars have argued (e.g., 
Friedman and Nissenbaum 1996), technical systems are not value-free – they carry the 
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One of the basic steps in the design of an AI system is the setting of a goal for an 
agent … Playing Atari, the goal is to maximise your points with least effort … What 
would be an equivalent goal in patient care? A sense of wellbeing? The normalising 
of a set of biochemical parameters? In a situation where we are all only too aware of 
the way in which corporate interest has conspired to influence the definition of 
disease, how would one set the goal within the sustainable business model DeepMind 
have discussed? (quoted in Armstrong 2016, 182) 
 
In cases where such technologies or practices can be shown to more effectively support 
relevant societal values, there exists moral justification to enable new data flows 
(Nissenbaum 2010) and novel governance forms. However, explicitly addressing the 
underlying value that is sought through use and reuse of PHI data, and, relatedly, the values 




The vast and growing stockpiles of PHI hold the promise of substantive improvements in 
the precision of personalized healthcare, in the quality and reliability of health service 
delivery, and in addressing growing costs of health services. Such improvements will 
depend in large part on technology-enabled innovations via big data analytics to develop 
new forms of value form PHI. To more effectively govern the complex, emergent, and 
networked nature of PHI storage and utilization, balancing between individual rights and the 
potential public good that could be realized and also the interests of innovative firms hoping 
to profit from such activities, requires that we examine, within each context where data are 
generated, used, and reused, who are the stakeholders and what their relevant interests and 
values are.  
 
Going beyond high-level assessments of cyber-security and general health data 
privacy protection (Independent Review Panel 2017; Powles and Hodson 2017), additional 
analytical tools and methods could help ensure that PHI governance goals are articulated, 
debated, and negotiated before conflicts develop, and ultimately these goals are realized in 
practice. As one approach, this study drew on Nissenbaum’s notion of contextual integrity and 
our earlier research on forms of data governance to examine the controversial public-private 
partnership between the Royal Free Trust and DMH. It shows how an analytical framework 
employing governance dimensions can be used to assess how actual or anticipated violations of 
contextual integrity may develop as there is a shift from traditional governance forms, such as 
those centered on clinical entities that are expected to adhere to health privacy regulations, to 
novel governance forms, such as those in which for-profit innovation firms are powerful 
stakeholders with substantively different norms, values, and interests in PHI data.  
 
 This case study is limited to a single emerging case. It relied on publicly available 
documentary sources, and interviews with experts published in newspapers and trade 






Winter, J. S., & Davidson, E. (2019). “Big data governance of personal health information and challenges to 
contextual integrity.” The Information Society, 35 (1),  36-51. doi:10.1080/01972243.2018.1542648 
 
 
Future research is required to address a number of key issues in greater detail, such as: What 
governance forms can help individuals effectively find voice in how their data are governed and 
(re)used? How can we foster transparency in big data analytics with regards to AI/machine 
learning and intellectual property constraints? What other governance forms might emerge that 
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diet, exercise) 
Clinical data (e.g., 
glucose level) 
Digital trace data, 
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Health care provider 






“The public” or 
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Health system, e.g., 
















Monetization of data 
Assuring and 
maintaining, e.g., 
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Tensions due to PHI data flow to new 
context 
Adjustments in governance forms  Unresolved tensions  
PHI Data Domains 
 
 Five years of health data on all 
patients provided to DMH, a for-profit 
IT firm. 
 Potential to combine patient health 
data with other data domains, such as 





 Public assurances by DMH that PHI 
would not be combined with data 
from other sources.  
 “Verifiable Data Audit” promised 
for data access and use, consistent 









 Public and policy makers’ reactions to 
data sharing arrangement with a for-
profit firm.  
 Data sharing with DMH AI researchers, 





 Public assurances that Alphabet will 
not have access to the data.  
 Making DMH data sharing 
agreements publicly accessible.  
 DMH’s patient engagement 
workshops to increase transparency 
and patient buy-in related to health 
data and AI.  
 
 
 New stakeholders in the future 
through open-ended data sharing 
arrangement for development of 
AI applications.  






PHI Data Value 
 
 Value of PHI beyond individual 
patient care and improvement of NHS 
for development of corporate 
 
 
 Revised Services Agreement 
acknowledging acquisition of PHI for 
AI development with regulatory 
 
 
 Standardizing and centralizing 
NHS clinical data to enhance its 
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intellectual property, applications and 
services, and algorithms.  
 
approvals; DMH’s retention of IP 
rights.  
 Negotiating sharing with NHS of 




 Emphasizing PHI reuse for health 
service innovation and IP development 
over established governance goals, e.g. 





 DeepMind Ethics & Society Fellows 
unit established to assess privacy, 
transparency, and fairness.  
 DeepMind policy to make future data 
sharing agreements public.  
 Regulatory requirement to comply 
with data protection regulations in 




 Conflict of interest in DeepMind 
auditing its own complaince. 
 Standardization of NHS PHI data 
to accommodate AI development 
in ways that reduce value of PHI 






 Identifiable PHI data on all patients seen 
at Royal Free Trust hospitals migrated 
without notification to individual 
patients.  
 Possible attempts to avoid patient 
consent regulations to enable efficient 
access to a broad spectrum of PHI. 
 First data sharing agreement differed 




 ICO oversight committee for all uses 
of the PHI created.  
 DMH Independent Review Panel 
assembled.  
 Revised data sharing agreement in 
November 2016.  
 “Verifiable Data Audit” to provide 
a real-time audit and verification of 




 Oversight committee panel 
members are not public servants 
and therefore not subject to NHS 
oversight and accountability. 
 ICO ruling that revised data 
sharing agreement failed to 
comply with the Data Protection 
Act and finding of possible 
conflict with GDPR. 
 Weak execution of opt out option 
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1 The acronym PHI may apply to personal health information broadly, or to data protected by regulation.  We use the term PHI in the 
broader sense. 
2 Our preliminary taxonomy includes PHI governance forms such as organizational (e.g., a hospital), inter-organization (e.g., a health-
information exchange entity), community (e.g., a social network of patients sharing clinical data), personal (e.g., individuals 
maintaining their own personal health records), marketplace (e.g., commercial PHI data aggregator), and public good (e.g., entities 
sharing PHI for academic or policy research). A full description is beyond the scope of this paper. Please see Winter and Davidson 
(2017) for additional details. 
3 Existing third-party data sharing arrangements included the 2014 Care.data program that made patient data available to organizations 
both inside and outside of the NHS, including health charities pharmaceutical companies, universities, hospital trusts, and other 
private companies, subject to approval (Solon 2014). This Care.data database sought to centralize PHI and has been a contentious 
process, with patient advocates claiming that patients have not been properly informed and given meaningful options to opt out 
(Triggle 2014). The program was halted in 2016. 
4 Interestingly, the report recommended the Independent Reviewers receive an honorarium, suggesting that the group’s allegiance may 
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5 See https://www.royalfree.nhs.uk/deepmind-patient-opt-out-form/ for the “DeepMind patient opt out form”. 
